Divine Temporality, Craig, Kant, and Epistemics - Thoughts

Ratio-reductionist theology culminates in counter-intuitive discourses. Ratio-reductionist theology is theology that attempts to map divine being and attributes in terms of extra-empirical/counter-empirical, i.e. purely rational conceptualization that is aversive of spatio-temporality, motion, change, plurality, and contingency - well conceptualized in the philosophies of monism and non-dualism.

Empirical theologies, on the other hand, do otherwise. Polytheistic theologies are a good example of these. The divine is spatio-temporal, and other things that come with it.

It is not surprising, therefore, when the logical consequence of something like the Kalam Cosmological Argument would be the attempt to temporalize God as seen in William Craig's position that the timeless God entered time at the time of creation. But, "creating" is a temporal concept, isn't it? If so, it would require God to be temporal before becoming temporal! 

But, why should it be necessary to say that God was or is "timeless"; then, why does it become necessary to attribute temporality to God? 

From the attempt to reconcile the rational categories of uniformity, immutability, abstraction/transcendence, universality, and necessity with the empirical categories of plurality, change, concreteness, particularity, and contingency have spun out various proposals such as platonism, panentheism, process theologies, particular non-dualism, and so on.

Kant was, perhaps, meekest enough to acknowledge that our concepts are limited by our faculties and experiences. He found theology a place not in reason or experience but in action that springs from the moral will. For Kant the pronouncement "The fool has said in his heart there is no God" would mean different from what Anselm understood. Anselm thought that the fool was a rational fool, whose pronouncement was logically-contradictory. For Kant, the fool was a moral fool, whose actions denied God in terms of radical evil. The moral fool might be well-versed in all the arguments for the existence of God while failing to practically know God in his life.

Udayana’s Arguments for the Existence of God (Nyaya Kusumanjali. 5)

The Nyaya Sutras was composed by Aksapada Gautama, probably in the 6th c. BC. Nyaya Sutra 1.6.32 states the parts (avyava) of a deduction (nigmana) in the aphorism:

PratijnaHetUdaharanOpanayNigmanAanyavyavaha

which unfolds as:
1. Pratijna - Claim or proposition (conjecture) that needs to be established (1.6.33)
2. Hetu - Reason (1.6.34)
3. Udaharana (Drstanta)- Empirical support (negative or positive case examples) (1.6.35,36)
4. Upanaya - Application (1.6.37)
5. Nigmana - Conclusion or deduction (restatement of claim) (1.6.38)

Example:
1. Pratijna Claim: The hill (full of trees (wood)) is on fire
2. Hetu Reason: Because I see smoke over it.
3. Udaharana Example: On a hearth (burning wood), fire and smoke are always seen together; but, never in a lake (without wood).
4. Upanaya Application: The smoke on the hill is like the smoke on the hearth, not like vapor over a lake.
5. Nigmana Deduction: Therefore, the hill is on fire

The Nyaya syllogism provides a relatively sufficient form for arguing from an effect to its cause. This is not sufficiently possible with either the hypothetical or the categorical syllogism. For instance,

If there is smoke, there must be fire.
There is smoke
Therefore, there must be fire.

If the hypothetical premise is assuming a causal relation, then granting priority (antecedence) to a causally consequent term (here, smoke) is problematic to the content of the form. It poses an informal problem. The logical positioning should give the causal term priority over the agented (effect). Thus,

If there is fire, there is smoke
There is fire
Therefore, there is smoke

OR

If there is fire, there is smoke
There is no smoke
Therefore, there is no fire

The syllogisms are valid and the conditional order in the premise is correct (fire is the condition for smoke, and not vice versa). The hypothetical syllogism cannot facilitate an argument from the effect back to the cause. Even granted the categorical limit of say “smoke can only be produced by fire”, it cannot be incorporated into a hypothetical syllogism.

Smoke can only be produced by fire.
Then,

If there is fire, there is smoke.
There is smoke.
Therefore, there is fire

OR

If there is smoke, there is fire.
There is smoke.
Therefore, there is fire.

The first one is invalid and the second one is valid; however, given the causal exclusivity of the hypothetical relation, the rules may be regarded as non-applicable to this exception. It, then, does indicate the insufficiency of the syllogism.

Let’s see if the categorical provides a way out.

All that is smoky is fiery
The hill is smoky
Therefore, the hill is fiery

OR
Every smoke effect has a fire cause
The hill has smoke effect
Therefore, the hill has fire cause

The conclusion necessarily follows from the premises since the syllogism is self-contained. In other words, one is not required to go beyond the syllogism to verify the conclusion once the major and minor premises are assumed to be true. The syllogism, unlike the Nyaya syllogism, does not practically explain why one thinks the effect observed on the hill is smoke and why one needs to connect smoke with fire. It, therefore, does not have the sufficient steps required for a self-contained argument from effect to cause. For instance,

Every effect has a cause
The universe is an effect
Therefore, the universe has a cause.

One will need to go beyond the syllogism to prove both the premises, especially the minor “the universe is an effect”. Why not consider the universe as the cause of the uncaused, given its “universal” status? Other syllogisms, therefore, will need to be used in order to support this syllogism. It is not sufficient by itself.

Also, from the perspective of Nyaya syllogism, the above argument lacks a case support (either homogeneous or heterogeneous example). One does not observe any universe being effected or caused nor does one ever observe a no-creator=no-universe instance. This is unlike the smoke-fire example, in which case there is at least an example to support the reason.

Let's now turn to what a Nyaya syllogism may prove or not prove.

The eight reasons that Udayana (10th c. AD) gives in his Nyaya Kusumanjali are:
1. Karyatvat
2. Ayojnat
3. Dhrti
4. Pad
5. Pratyay
6. Shruti
7. Vakya
8. Sankhya vishesh


We will look at the Karyatvat argument here:

kshityadikam sakartrkam karyatvat ghatvat
sakartrkatvam ch upadanagocharaprokshajnanchikirshakrtimanjanyatvam

Similar to an earthen jar, the earth etc are agented (have the nature of being effected).
To be agented means to be produced by one who has immediate knowledge of the raw material (material cause), has the desire to produce, and has effort that meets the effect or work (or is of the profession that concerns the work being produced).

It may be structured as:

1. Pratijna Claim: The earth, etc is caused by an all-wise, willing, and working agent.
2. Hetu Reason: Because the earth, etc are agented.
3. Udaharana Example: Agented works like a clay pot are produced by an agent having knowledge of clay (raw material), having desire to create, and having done works that are appropriate for claypot creation.
4. Upanaya Application: The earth etc are like a clay pot which is agented (possessing material cause and capable of being sense-perceived), unlike non-agented eternals (immaterials and invisibles or materially imperceptibles).
5. Nigmana Deduction: Therefore, the earth, etc are created by one who knows all (about the material cause of earth etc), is willing to create, and has worked to create them.

At first sight, this may seem to indicate that the creator here is one who uses some pre-existing raw material to create the world. However, the raw-material (here implying clay) is in connection to the pot. It is a homogeneous example of the bigger clay jar, the earth. The argument qualifies the agent (creator) with the qualities of wisdom, will, and work. By implication, the creator of a clay pot has knowledge of clay; the creator of the universe is omniscient. The creator of a clay pot chooses to make the pot; the creator of the universe freely chooses to create it. The creator of a clay pot works in a manner and with a force suitable and necessary for the production of a pot. The omnipotent creator of the universe does creative works suitable to the production of the world. Only an omnipotent and omniscient Agent is suited for the profession of universe-creation.

The example of claypot is homogeneous with a moldable and shapeable (potential) material cause. However, we are still not in a position to claim if fundamental matter itself (or that which the universe is at least partially composed of) is not uncaused but caused (ex nihilo). Obviously, there is no example to support something being created out of nothing. In Nyaya metaphysics, therefore, the fundamental non-composite material cause (atoms, space, etc) is eternal. And, since atoms, etc are bereft of desire and intelligence, they can only be used to create earth, etc by an intelligent and volitional agent.

References:
● Randle, H. N. "A Note on the Indian Syllogism." Mind, New Series, 33, no. 132 (1924): 398-414. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2249556.
● George Chemparathy, An Indian Rational Theology (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass in Komm., 1972), p.86
● Acharya Visvesvar Siddhanta Siromani, न्यायकुसुमांजलि (Varanasi: Chowkamba Vidya Bhawan, 1962).
● Peri Laxminarayan Shastri, న్యాయకుసుమాంజలి (Chennapuri: Vavilla Ramswami Shastrulu and Sons,1939)
● Dayanand Bhargav, तर्क संग्रह: (Motilal Banarsidass, 1998)

If God Is Love Means The Father Eternally Loves The Son, Does God Is Judge Means He Eternally Judges The Son?

Augustine in the eighth book of On Trinity begins to talk of love as involving three substances: the lover, the loved, and love. Modern apologists like Ravi Zacharias have argued that the statement God is Love could only be true if God is essentially and eternally a Triune being: the Father eternally loves the Son through the Holy Spirit. Thus, it was not that God was all alone (a monad) before the creation and had nothing to love, but being the Triune inter-personal God, He ever existed as Love.

Of course, Augustine also talks about the possibility of loving oneself and sees three things involved in this as well: "when the mind knows itself and loves itself, there remains a trinity: mind, love, knowledge; and this trinity is not confounded together by any commingling". However, in this mono-love, there is only one person, though one may divide the experience into the lover, the loved, and love. Loving oneself is not inter-personal, and therefore possesses no love act of self-giving and submission. Therefore, the concept of the Triune God as Love is considered significant.

One objection raised to this argument goes something like this: If God is love means the Father eternally loves the Son through the Spirit, does God is Judge means the Father eternally judges the Son through the Spirit? And this applies to all statements such as "God is jealous" or "God is a consuming fire". Is the Father eternally jealous or eternally consuming the Son? The objection tries to reduce the argument to ad absurdum.

A few clarifications are necessary. The objection misses the difference between love and the other mentioned predicates. "Jealous" here is an adjective, not a noun. "Consuming fire" is metaphorical for the righteousness of God in His judgment. "Judge" is an office which stands in relation to the created world. The statement "God is Love" is not the same as "God is Loving". When one says that "God is Love", there is an identity of substance and not just participation in or possessing of an attribute. This cannot be predicated of any other being. For instance, one cannot say that Mr. A is Love; we only say Mr. A is loving in nature. To say God is Love is to speak in absolute and infinite terms. The statement "God is Love" points to God as the ground of all morality and personality. Note the following excerpt from a previous post:

There are at least three approaches to understanding Trinity.

The Rational Approach. ... personality finds its best explanation in the personal nature of God, whose existence as three persons (I-YOU-HE Sufficiency) in one Godhead is the ground of personhood.

The Moral Approach. It seeks to find in the doctrine of Trinity a rational ground for the absolute nature of moral virtues, such as love, goodness, and joy. If God didn’t eternally exist in a subject-object relationship, then He would be amoral and morality would not be absolute. The doctrine of Trinity provides a rational ground for any discussion of morality with respect to its absolute nature.... [See Illustrating Trinity]

Love is the summation of morality and personality and morality cannot be dissected of each other. To be a person is to be moral. Therefore, the reality of personality and morality must find an ontological ground in an infinite inter-personal Beginning and End of all things. The Triune Persons cannot be FOUR since inter-personal sufficiency is sufficed by the I-YOU-HE tri-personal Sufficiency), or else infinitude would be reduced to finite polytheism without any essential unity. Thus, the revelation of God as Love is crucial to our understanding of every other contingent reality of moral personhood.

Does the Moral Law Require a Moral Lawgiver?

One popular version of the moral argument for the existence of God has been that the reality or rational necessity of the moral law proves the existence of a moral lawgiver. However, we must admit that there are religious philosophies, especially in Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism that do not find a leap from moral law to moral lawgiver necessary at all. In fact, in these, the moral law exists independently to any concept of deity. So, how justified is the argument from law to lawgiver?

I believe that the concept of a moral law and God are inseparable. Perhaps, the name God is better than the term Lawgiver, because the moral law doesn't exist because of an arbitrary command of God (as in divine command theories). Certainly, the moral law doesn't exist apart from God as if He only discovered or knew the principle and gave interpretations to humans in the form of rules and norms. The moral law is not just a set of commandments. It is the law of relationship between persons. Persons have the faculty for self-awareness and self-determination, which takes into account inter-personal relationships. A natural law is a law of relationship between elements or forces of nature. But, the moral law is the law of relationship between moral beings.

To say that the moral law can exist independent of God (Triune Inter-personal Being) is to claim that the moral law is not personal, or if it is personal, it isn't absolute and eternal. Obviously, it couldn't be absolute and eternal if it were restricted to just the flux of this-worldly phenomenon.

Also, this argues against the idea of an impersonal God. If God is impersonal, only impersonal laws would exist. The Eastern views consider personal consciousness as imperfect and impersonal existence as perfect. Thus, in their ultimate argument, the moral law would be very illusory. However, they cannot establish how such an idea could be justified by a "person" whose status of existence is "personal" and not "impersonal".

We know that the moral law exists by the fact that moral beings have concepts of justice and retribution. It is another thing if some call evil as good and good as evil. People usually resort to moral reasoning to settle these differences. However, moral reasoning about what is just and what is unjust would be baseless if there is not a law above the cultural or political "commandments", "traditions", and "customs" of men. Morality would then be highly relative, as some already accept so. But, to say that morality is relative is to make an absolute statement with the normative implication that relative laws ought not to be regarded as either good or evil. The relativist position is self-defeating.

This implies that the moral law does exist eternally and absolutely, not somewhere in the outer space but in the way in which persons are naturally inter-related. This involves the emotional-attitudinal-actional inter-relationship between persons. Such inter-personal relating cannot be the result of impersonal forces-- for if it were, then the idea of personal justice would be ultimately absurd. This effect of moral inter-relations cannot be caused by amoral causes. The cause must be Absolute, Eternal, and Inter-Personal. Therefore, we say that the reality of the moral law invites us to acknowledge the reality of the Triune God.

Does Morality Make Sense Without God? or Is God Necessary for Morality?

India is distinctly the birthplace of certain atheistic or agnostic religio-philosophical systems that have upheld morality without any reference to God as the Moral Governor of the universe. The systems of Samkhya, Yoga, Jainism, and Buddhism didn't find the concept of "God" as necessary for the validation of moral principles. Of course, popular religion as practiced by the masses cannot let go off the personal connection with a Deity or a Revered One, whatever be the theological explanation of the same. Yet, in polytheistic, atheistic, and monist traditions, God is not the source or ground of morality.

This seems to pose a pragmatic problem for the Moral Argument which some philosophers, like Kant, have considered to be the only possible argument for the existence of God. The problem, however, only relates to the nature of morality in each system. Most of the Indian systems are karmic in nature, though differing in their cosmological and ontological theories of reality--for instance, Jainism teaches a dualistic pluralism while Advaita propounds a non-dualistic cosmology. Whether these cosmologies can successfully sustain their respective karmic theologies is another issue. Philosophers in each system have tried to debate with those of others for centuries with little or no agreement.

The logical course eventually leads to a questioning of the supposedly cosmological foundations of the moral theory. However, one also needs to answer whether it is the cosmology that undergirds the moral system or is it the moral system that undergirds the cosmology. In other words, which is the first hypothesis: the moral theory or the cosmology?

Obviously, one cannot escape the fundamental nature of faith in the ultimate sense. But, faith can be questioned. One can still analyse where each of these systems is headed to; whether it be dissolution and recreation or the quest for awakening. The moral question, then, cannot succeed in not trying to address the issue of the whole picture, or worldview.

The significance of the theistic moral argument is in doing justice to the very intrinsic nature of morality.

1. Morality is inter-personal; therefore, its ground must be the infinite, inter-personal God.
2. Morality is absolute; therefore, its ground must be the transcendent and immanent, immutable, absolute God.
3. Morality implies rewards and punishment; therefore, justice must be provided by a moral God and not an amoral mechanism, which is deterministic in nature.
4. Morality is intentional; therefore, the Moral Governor must be omniscient.
5. Morality is practical; therefore, the Moral Governor must be omnipotent.
6. Morality is beneficial; therefore, the Moral Governor must be good.
7. Morality appeals to the affective; therefore, God must necessarily be Love.